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Psychoanalytic Underpinnings of 
Socially-Shared Normativity
Michael Forrester*
School of Psychology, University of Kent, Canterbury, United Kingdom
Alongside social anthropology and discursive psychology, conversation analysis has 
highlighted numerous ways in which cultural forms of perceiving and acting in the world 
are primarily rooted in socially shared normativity. However, when consideration turns to 
the origins and purposes of human affect and emotion, ethnomethodology, and 
conversation analysis appear to face particular difficulties that arise from the over-arching 
focus on sense-making practices. This article considers the proposal that psychoanalytic 
thinking might inform our understanding of how socially shared normativity emerges during 
infancy and early childhood. First, a framework is sketched out that highlights the fact 
that from the beginning, an infant’s earliest experience is bound up with those procedures, 
practices, and social actions that make up what conversation analysts call members’ 
methods. Second, comparisons are drawn between conversation analysis and 
psychoanalytic accounts of early experience for infants during the first years of life. 
Discussion then moves to the Kleinian notion of object relations and the concept of 
projective identification. Essentially, this is a theoretical account of how “what-was-
once-one” (the mother-infant unit) somehow differentiates resulting in the gradual 
emergence of the “individuated being.” What is often glossed over in this account is the 
discursively embedded nature of projective identification; a process that is itself 
interdependent with the embodiment that makes up the infant’s lived engagement with 
the world. Whatever might constitute consciousness emerges from somatic, embodied, 
material-physical, tactile/affective experience – that is, a fundamentally social milieu. 
Ultimately, this raises the question of how transformation (i.e., from the social to the 
individual) occurs. One answer may be Winnicott’s idea of the transitional space, where 
the “good-enough” parent is said to be somebody, who can “contain” both negative and 
positive identifications coming from the infant, transform and re-project such identifications, 
but in modified form. In this way, the infant begins to recognize/experience what it is they 
are “feeling.” Such projective identifications are conveyed within and through the prevailing 
discourses that constitute all social practices. Concluding comments note that conversation 
analysis may find in psychoanalytic thinking a framework for understanding the 
interdependence between affect and action, given that in psychoanalytic thought, we find 
a thoroughly relational conception of human nature.
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INTRODUCTION
Over at least last 50  years or so, since Sack’s (1992) seminal 
lectures, there is little doubt that alongside social anthropology 
and discursive psychology, conversation analysis has highlighted 
numerous ways in which cultural forms of perceiving and 
acting in the world are rooted in socially shared normativity. 
However, when consideration turns to the origins and purposes 
of human affect and emotion, conversation analysis appears 
to face particular challenges regarding the relations between 
action and emotion that may arise from the over-arching focus 
on sense-making practices found in this approach (Sorjonen 
and Peräkylä, 2012). As follows, the suggestion will be  made 
that the researchers interested in the primary roots of socially 
shared normativity may have an unrecognized difficulty with 
breaking away from deeply held assumptions regarding affective 
or emotional dimensions of human experience, particularly 
the notion that these remain private or individuated (pertaining 
only to a specific individual’s private experience). In order to 
help dispel or disabuse such unrecognized presuppositions, a 
case is made for considering new psychoanalytic approaches 
to affect and emotion, where one finds a socially saturated 
conception of what constitutes psychological life – specifically 
in what have become known as object-relation approaches.
The first part of the article will highlight research in 
conversation analysis (CA form here) that has explicated the 
fact that from birth, an infant’s earliest experience is bound 
up with those procedures, practices, and social actions that 
make up what are termed members’ methods. Observations 
will then be  offered that draw attention to a certain avoidance 
or elision regarding the domain of affect and to detailed 
discussion of what kind of implicit model(s) of subject-hood 
are oriented to by researchers in child-focused CA. Having 
highlighted challenges CA work faces when studying the 
interdependence of affect and action, the second part of the 
article outlines a partial summary of developmental 
psychoanalytic thought, specifically some of the key ideas in 
the object-relations school. This forms the basis for suggesting 
that child-focused CA may find this perspective a rich source 




From the beginning, an infant’s earliest experience is bound 
up with the practices and social actions that make up what 
ethnomethodology call members’ methods. In the emerging 
child-focused conversation analytic literature, there are indications 
that the domain of what constitutes “talk-in-interaction” has 
expanded considerably. Numerous studies document and explicate 
the diverse range of social practices that together form the 
rich nexus of multi-modal events that together form the 
acculturation frame for the infant and young child. We  find 
representative examples of recent work for instance on touch, 
embodiment, crying, laughter, whining, pleasure, and affect 
(Wiggins, 2002; Laurier and Wiggins, 2011; Fantasia et al., 2014, 
2015a,b; Cekaite, 2015; Jenkins and Hepburn, 2015; Berducci, 
2016; Walker, 2017; Butler and Edwards, 2018). This research 
seems to indicate that in child-focused conversation analysis 
(CA from here), the boundaries of what would normally come 
under the umbrella term “talk-in-interaction” continue to expand. 
However, there may be  a slight ambiguity or unrecognized 
difficulty with such expansion as it seems to indicate a move 
away from the methodological foundation stone (or lodestone) 
of reflexive accountability. Consider the following comment 
from Livingston (1987) that highlights the all-pervasive nature 
of the ethnomethodologically informed CA project:
What the common person knows or does not know is 
not at issue. Instead, the central issue and the central 
research problem is the examination of the unwitting, 
without extrinsic motivation, production of the ordinary 
social object. …[it is a] massive domain of phenomena - 
the domain of practical action and practical reasoning. It 
is this omnipresent domain of practical methods, through 
which and wherein people make of the things they are 
doing the things that they accountably are, that the 
ethnomethodologist seeks to investigate. By examining 
those methods in the material detail of their always-
idiosyncratic embodiments, the ethnomethodologist 
seeks to understand those methods in and as that same, 
endlessly diversified, identifying specificity. (p.  12 – 
emphasis in original)
In effect, all social practices are open to analysis, including 
the practices and procedures of scientists, social researchers, 
and conversation analysts themselves. A couple of things are 
noticeable about this programmatic statement. First, there is 
the elision or avoidance of terms and concepts that presuppose 
knowledge, mental states (and one would surmise, emotion 
and affect), and anything that might be  said to be  “inside” 
or private to the individual. While this reflects the healthy 
skepticism CA and discursive psychology exhibit toward the 
logocentric excesses of traditional psychology (Coulter, 1999; 
Edwards and Potter, 2005), we  can ask whether such elision 
may raise difficulties for understanding affective dimensions 
of talk-in-interaction. As Sorjonen and Peräkylä (2012) put it, 
“we do not yet have a satisfactory understanding of the relation 
between action and emotion.” (p.  9).
Second, methodic practice is both omnipresent and at the 
same time, evidenced through procedures of reflexive 
accountability, a competency that an infant or young child is 
unlikely to possess and which thus positions her in a kind 
of ethnomethodological limbo. The classic CA position regarding 
membership of a culture is that it is something that is gradually 
attained, in the sense that a child has to learn those performances 
and practices that constitute “doing” membership appropriately 
(Garfinkel and Sacks, 1970). However, as Shakespeare (1998) 
argues, because children are not effectively full members, the 
child’s role in interaction is constructed in terms of them 
building toward becoming a competent person, where much 
of their experience is replete with examples from adults 
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concerning how to achieve full membership. Do infants and 
young children learn how to display affect and emotion from 
adults – simply as a set of actions or stances? Or do we assume 
that (spontaneous, innate) emotion states are molded by adults 
such that display reflects cultural dimensions of normativity? 
Questions of this nature seem to indicate a role for developing 
a discourse of affective-normativity.
Becoming a full member then presupposes possessing the 
skills and competencies that surround whatever it is taken as 
the appropriate performance or display of emotion. Sorjonen 
and Peräkylä (2012) suggest that perhaps the closest relation 
between emotion and action (methodic practice) is to be found 
in “displays of emotion that, at least in some context, can 
be  considered as action” (p.  9). If we  think about the areas 
where expressions of affect are being studied (such as crying, 
whining, complaining, and laughing), it seems that child focused 
CA is moving closer to a position where affect and emotion 
is conceptually associated with normativity. Whatever 
we  understand by the terms affect and emotion, the question 
remains whether this is something – a dimension or domain – 
that remains unique (private) to the individual, or instead 
part of those members methods (social practices) that ultimately 
depend on learning what counts as appropriate performance.
Some discussion regarding normative dimensions or domains 
of affect seems important given the emergence of infant and 
child-focused CA work. Recent research documenting and 
describing the subtle and delicate nature of multi-modal social 
practices underpinning early parent-child talk-in-interaction is 
drawing attention to the social-semiotic embodied dimensions 
of affective-normativity (e.g., Cekaite, 2016; Kern, 2018; Holm 
Kvist, 2018). From the outset, whatever we  are calling the 
infant’s “experience” or consciousness is interdependent with 
the specific social and cultural practices surrounding birth, 
childhood, dependency, mothering, asymmetry – i.e., whatever 
makes up the matrix of social practices surrounding the infant. 
However, even to use a term such as “surrounding” immediately 
draws attention to difficulties regarding what is presupposed 
by categories and constructs such as personhood, individuality, 
separation, subject, and object, and in fact, all those terms 
and associations brought into play when we seek to understand 
what makes for a socially shared normativity. One can imagine 
that a CA perspective on what an affect-focused socially shared 
normativity would constitute, would be  one where whatever 
we  understand as mutual engagement, is something where the 
mutuality being displayed is viewed as evidence that there 
exists (and is in play) a normative system oriented to by the 
participants who are involved in “doing engagement” or joint 
participation. However, can one successfully “perform” doing-
being-emotionally engaged, such that said performance is open 
to scrutiny and reflexive accountability? Part of the difficulty 
surrounding thinking about affective dimensions of normativity 
(i.e., those conventions and practices associated with the display 
and performance of emotion) may be  linked to the empirical 
requirements of CA, particularly that analytic interpretation 
should rest upon identifiable participant-oriented evidence in 
talk-in-interaction itself. Such a requirement may engender an 
avoidance for developing a theoretically informed discourse 
or set of descriptions for what constitutes affect or emotion.
Recent work in CA highlights the various interdependencies 
between sequential organization and the display of emotion 
or participant’s “emotional stance” (Goodwin, 2007; Stivers, 
2008; Voutilainen et  al., 2014), and understandably this line 
of work exhibits a pervasive focus on the performance details 
of the fine-grained orderliness, in what one might call an 
example of methodological “affect avoidance.” Maynard and 
Freese (2012), for example, in a subtle and detailed analysis, 
draw out the significance of intonation during the on-going 
production and reception of good and bad news, making the 
point that their approach,
Shares the constructionist commitment to studying 
display of emotion in interaction and remaining agnostic 
about the existence of internal accompaniments to such 
displays. (p. 94). [emphasis added]
What is interesting here is that this agnosticism nevertheless 
presupposes a possible backdrop of internal emotional states  – 
which remains beyond discussion (for empirical reasons). 
Similarly, for Goodwin and Goodwin (2000) emotion is a social 
phenomenon that is made visible or constructed in and through 
the systemic practices lodged within the processes of situated 
action, “used by participants to build in concert with each 
other the events that make up their life world” (p.  569). What 
does warrant comment is the difficulty that CA and related 
discursive approaches appear to have regarding terms such as 
affect and emotion.
Building on work in philosophy, aesthetics and critical theory 
(e.g., Massumi, 2002; Deleuze and Guattari, 2013) a number 
of writers emphasize a recent affective turn, characterized as 
a movement toward understanding domains of experience 
outside of the dominant paradigm of representation (Clough 
and Halley, 2007). In a recent special issue on affect and 
subjectivity, Lara et al. (2017) make the point that the “missing 
subject” is one of the predominant critiques of the turn to 
affect, where there is “considerable unease about what a vacated 
subject meant for questions of power and agency.” (p.  32).
Examining these developments, Wetherell (2013) describes 
the aim of affect theory [an approach that emphasize processes, 
beyond, below, and past discourse, (e.g., Massumi, 2002; Thrift, 
2008)], as a perspective that aims to “deliver the tools required 
for lively, textured research on embodied social action and 
for productive insights into the entangled forms of assembling 
constituting social life moment to moment.” (p. 351). Describing 
example views of affect theory, Wetherell (2013) comments 
on Massumi’s (2002) affect as excess viewpoint, where:
“He [Massumi] maintains that affect is thus a kind of 
intensity, making a difference below the threshold of 
consciousness, thrusting the subject into particular 
kinds of relations with the material, and social world…
[and]…discourse works on a different track from 
affect  – a ‘quality’ track as opposed to the ‘intensity’ 
track. The quality track leads to naming, and to the 
framing of affect in conventional discursive, linguistic 
and cultural terms. If affect is a kind of chaotic excess 
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and the unprocessed push, then the moment of 
discursive representation is bureaucratic and 
organizational. For Massumi, it is the process by which 
potentially ‘wild’ affect is tamed, turned into something 
people can recognize, talk about to each other and 
communicate as ‘domesticated’ emotion.” (p. 354).
Attempting to build a productive dialogue between traditions 
in discourse studies (e.g., CA) and new lines of research in 
affect and emotion, Wetherell (2013) examines a sequence from 
Goodwin’s (2006) work on children’s playground games, noting 
that Goodwin seeks to explore affect and discourse equally, 
assuming that, “these are entangled in the sense that embodied 
action (on a scale of intensity) tends to be  bound up with 
talk at some point in a flow of activity” (p.  360). Her analysis 
concludes that research such as Goodwin’s (2006) moves beyond 
a simple binary divide of “affect vs. discourse” given that 
this work,
effectively conveys the feel and patterning of bodies in 
action, the lively flow of social life and sticks closely to 
participants’ perspectives…(and)…it puts both affect 
and discourse back where they should be  within 
emergent patterns of situated activity, and makes the 
patterns, as they need to be, the main research focus. 
(Wetherell, 2013, p. 364).
Certainly, there is little doubt that the Goodwin’s have been 
significant in developing the notion of affective stance loosely 
defined as “a positioning accomplished through conduct and 
thereby made publicly accessible” (Sorjonen and Peräkylä, 2012, 
p.  5). Whatever affects are within CA, they can be  utilized 
as resources – something that people in talk-in-interaction 
can draw on. Following their helpful explication of bodily 
compliance by children Goodwin et  al. (2012) argue that 
alongside the traditional study of facial expression and the 
psychology of emotion, research should consider,
the relevant actions and bodily displays of the parties 
they are interacting with. We argue specifically that the 
body of the party producing an emotional display 
cannot be  examined in isolation. Crucial to the 
organization of emotion as public practice is the way in 
which individuals display rapidly changing stances 
toward both other participants, and the actions currently 
in progress. (p. 39–40)
For Goodwin et  al. (2012), affective stance and emotion 
are not “add-ons” but “constitute central components of the 
situated actions participants build to carry out the mundane 
activities that make up the lived social world they inhabit 
together.” (p.  40).
Interestingly, such comments are not so far removed from 
those emotion theorists in developmental psychology who 
20  years ago, and coming from the opposite direction, called 
for a move away from a focus on the unifying role of a 
“central feeling state” toward a realization of what the child 
is doing to adapt his or her goals to the environment, and 
to modify the environment to fits said goals (Campos et  al., 
1989). Described as “emotion regulation,” displays of affect 
involved, “regulating the action tendencies of the other 
facilitating action tendencies when desirable, redirecting them 
when necessary, or preventing them when culture or danger 
dictates” (Campos et al., 1989, p. 397). While understanding, 
what does seem clear is that in CA theoretical elaboration 
regarding discourses of affect and emotion tends either to 
be  avoided or deemed unnecessary, given that whatever it 
might be, it is reducible to social praxis – will always remain 
an empirical question linked to requirements of participant-
orientation and the display of methodic practice. This 
suggestion here is that such a constraint may be  unhelpful 
when considerations turn to theoretical underpinnings of 
socially shared normativity.
Before moving to the main focus of this article, certain 
psychoanalytic perspectives on affect and emotion (with regard 
to discourse, methodic practice, and normativity), some comments 
are warranted regarding conceptions of the infant/child’s mind 
we  find in CA. Understandably, given the work that CA and 
discursive psychology have done so as to provide and alternative 
view to that found in traditional developmental psychology 
(Leslie, 1987; Perner, 1992) commentators are certainly suspicious 
or circumspect about presupposing a foundational or causal 
significance to “internal” development (e.g., cognitive 
development, emotional maturation, neurobiological change and 
so on). In their critique of the overemphasis on “theory of 
mind” and its relation to cognitive competence in developmental 
psychology, Lerner et  al. (2011) make the point that cognitive 
representational conceptions of underlying skills should conform 
to, “the actual requirements of the observable interaction order 
and participant in it – for example, the structurally afforded 
ability to recognize, project, and contingently employ unfolding 
structures of action in interaction with others.” (p.  45). For 
CA whatever cognitive capacities are found to underwrite 
interactional order, the specification of the relevant elements 
of this domain requires a close and systematic analysis of 
naturally occurring interaction addressed to the manifold 
contingencies of everyday life, and the social-sequential structures 
that enable human interaction. Lerner et  al. (2011) comment;
It seems to us that very young children only require the 
in situ practiced capacities required to recognize, in each 
particular case, the formal structures of the in-progress 
actions that recurrently fill their social interactional 
world and the practical skills to participate in each 
context-specific realizations of those structures of action 
as they are progressively realized, and as each next 
element in its progressive realization, projects a next 
constituent of that structure. (p. 57).
What underscores CA child-focused analysis, is that while 
there may be  some recognition that social interaction may in 
part depend on evolved neural mechanisms of (an individual’s) 
brain, there is no defensible basis for the presupposition that 
the skills and competencies employed derive from cognitive 
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representational entities in the mind. For Lerner et  al. (2011) 
the young child’s abilities are to be  understood as akin to 
affordance-like capacities intimately connected with detecting 
patterns in the ongoing sequence of actions and events made 
available to them through talk-in-interaction.
Similarly, in recent work by Keel (2015), when summarizing 
pre-school children’s skills and competencies when building 
up a normative position of the surrounding world, comments;
my detailed study of how children deploy assessments 
to achieve self-praise, noticings, announcements, 
complaints, or requests displays their orientation toward 
participants’ membership categories, the responsibilities 
and rights that are bound to them, and the larger 
praxeological context, adapting their way of packaging 
their initial assessment and mobilizing different 
sequential, formal, linguistic and embodied resources 
accordingly. (p. 218).
The picture of the child’s mind here is of an entity who 
can “package assessments” and adapt them to circumstances, 
and mobilize resources of various kinds. The entity is certainly 
constructivist but further commentary on what constitutes the 
“being-who-is-constructing” is avoided or evaded. A similarly 
cautious or circumspect perspective can be  seen in the earlier 
work of Wootton (1997) when discussing children’s emerging 
competences underpinning their capacity to use local and 
public  understanding(s):
Around that time (aged two years old) the child develops 
the skill to identify and draw on local knowledge which 
has been made apparent within prior interaction. Because 
this knowledge is contingent and local I have chosen to 
use the term “understanding” to describe it rather than 
a term like “representation,” the latter indexing forms of 
knowledge which have a more enduring status within 
the mind. (Wootton, 1997, 192–193).
Notice that understandings are something that are now 
public and accountable – social objects produced and reproduced 
in the ongoing dynamics of interaction. However, the idea or 
notion of the child’s mind (as nevertheless existing and being 
something separate from that which is experience) remains in 
the background in CA. Beyond the assumptions that this agent 
is a learning being who accrues the skills and abilities to 
employ available resources (e.g., the competencies to draw on 
local knowledge), discussion regarding emotion or affect seems 
to be  something to be  avoided.
There are then a number of challenges that CA faces when 
seeking to understand the relationship between action and 
affect/emotion, particularly for child-focused research. The 
members method criteria underpinning membership status (e.g., 
reflexive accountability) seems to be  glossed over once the 
detail of adult-child engagement and participation begins to 
be  examined (Forrester and Reason, 2006; Filipi, 2009). In 
addition, while considered and important insights have come 
from research on affective stance, such insights still seem to 
rest on the possible existence of person-experience affect/emotion 
state(s). There remains an understandable reluctance to discuss 
or develop a conceptual framework or discourse regarding 
affect. Parallels to such avoidance or elision can be  found in 
the guardedness or skepticism regarding cognitive dimensions 
of the developing child in early child-focused CA work. Although 
such caution has helped counter the excessive formalisms of 
the dominant and traditional approaches in disciplines such 
as developmental psychology (e.g., Leslie, 1987; Perner, 1992); 
this seems to have left a vacuum or absence when it comes 
to trying to think through what a discourse of affective-
normativity might look like. Psychoanalytic approaches may 
offer some helpful suggestions in this regard, as other critical 
theorists have pointed out (Frosch, 2003; Hollway, 2011).
OBJECT-RELATIONS PERSPECTIVES  
ON AFFECT
We can begin by noting that the psychoanalytic developmental 
account of the emergence of emotion or affect comes from a 
perspective that is not only at odds with CA accounts but is 
somewhat different from the dominant views found in 
developmental psychology. In psychoanalytic thinking, the forces 
at play in the mind are dynamic and unceasing and motivated 
by primitive and ultimately biologically oriented forces of energy, 
both positive and negative (traditionally termed “instincts”). 
The objects and entities said to make up the unconscious are 
a motley collection of undesirable, and unrealizable/
incomprehensible elements, some constitutional others acquired 
and constantly seeking to undermine whatever we  understand 
as the coherence of the ego. This is a view of mind where 
the human (adult, child, or infant) is a being who possesses 
certain attributes and characteristics of mind that forever seek 
to undercut whatever notions one has of possessing a stable 
mind (conscious-self) entity. Leaving aside the long-discussed 
issues surrounding methodology and empirical support1, this 
perspective certainly stands in stark contrast to the perspective 
found in CA or in contemporary developmental psychology.
One particularly different and noticeable aspect about the 
psychoanalytic view of the developing child is the idea that 
from the beginning the issue of separateness and “self-identity” 
is called into question – this is the significance of the Freudian 
legacy of the later 19th century. Rather than just assuming 
there is a sense of separateness accompanying the infant’s 
experience of the earliest moments of life, the psychoanalytic 
view asks under what conditions are we  to understand how 
an infant “attains” or moves to the position of experiencing 
“separateness” or “individuation” in the first place? Psychoanalytic 
thought requires or demands a critical examination of any 
1 The question of methodology and what counts as defensible empirical support 
across EM/CA, developmental psychology, and psychoanalytic research rests 
on the specifics of each research tradition – i.e., concerns will reflect prevailing 
criteria regarding appropriateness, defensibility, and correctness within each 
approach. Methodological observations regarding contrasts and comparisons 
are beyond the scope or focus of this paper.
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assumptions and presuppositions surrounding awareness, self, 
or whatever we might want to call consciousness of separateness. 
Theoretically developed accounts of the developing self are to 
be  found in the object-relations view of Klein (1949, 1957) 
and Winnicott (1960, 1974), and in recent psychosocial 
approaches (e.g., Stern, 1985; Hollway, 2006; Walkerdine, 2014).
The psychoanalyst Donald Winnicott, for example, consistently 
emphasized the role of affective states said to be  (constituted) 
by movement between states of ego disintegration and partial 
integration of “self-awareness.” In this account to “exist” as an 
infant at all is to some extent an achievement. To paraphrase 
Green (1999), Winnicott’s unique contribution was to show 
that at the beginning the notion of a separate baby is incoherent, 
and that,
it is necessary to include the mother in the indissoluble 
couple that they form. That is to say, no discourse on the 
affect can be sustained that does not take account of the 
mother’s affects, her tolerance of the child’s regressive 
needs, even of a state of informal chaos, the necessary 
conditions for the establishment of a kernel of vital 
affective continuity (emphasis in the original, p. 77).
Psychoanalysts such as Green (1999) draw attention to the 
constraining representation-affect opposition prevalent in psychology 
and philosophy and instead seek to confront the affective basis 
of the sense of existence, as well as encouraging the development 
of an affect discourse. Possibly one of the difficulties we encounter 
when addressing affect and emotion is the pervasive or 
all-encompassing (and yet elusive) nature of what it is we  are 
trying to get at, or to quote Green (1999) again,
that the essence of affect is its dynamic attribute, its 
capacity to seep into other domains and inhabit them 
and finally to transform both itself and products of the 
area of the mind that it has occupied. (p. 285).
Part of the problem when thinking through what might 
constitute an affective-normative dimension to social life is 
the possibility that such a dimension undercuts or rather 
permeates all aspects of life. For now, let us continue the 
psychoanalytic narrative regarding beginnings and the emergence 
of early psychic life for the infant.
Building on Freud’s concept of instinct, the “object” of 
object-relations theory is anything that is employed by the 
instinct(s) in order to achieve its aim, Klein (1963) describes 
in detail how the child moves through different stages of 
psychic development, starting from an initial biologically 
determined state where both “life” and “death” instincts are 
in play. From the beginning the dangers, challenges, and 
opportunities engendered by these contrasting instinctual forces 
leads to a psychic splitting or differentiation of “good” and 
“bad” objects:
Even the child who has a loving relation with his mother 
has also unconsciously a terror of being devoured, torn 
up, and destroyed by her. (Klein, 1963, p. 277)
The model of the early mind is of a fragile ego that is 
sensitive to processes of dissociation and fragmentation – 
fragmentation due of the piecemeal way in which the world 
is “introjected,” and dissociative because there is the ever-present 
inherent (internal) danger expressed as anxiety (i.e., determined 
by the death instinct). Working on the assumption that the 
human organism is likely to come into the world with a 
rudimentary ability to sense danger, Klein associated life’s first 
experiences of anxiety not with acquired or learnt mental 
abilities, but with an internal registering of unconscious tendencies 
that Freud had termed the death instinct. In other words, 
survival meant that the baby was born knowing about death 
and sensing her internal destructive instincts, and this first 
knowledge took the form of a primordial terror or annihilation. 
Anxiety is thus basic to all living states, however immature, 
and it is this underpinning sense of danger and potential 
disintegration that gives rise to a spontaneous splitting. At 
this point is should be emphasized that this discussion focused 
on the earliest moments of infancy and young childhood – 
approximately the first year of life (leaving aside later the 
complications and challenges of sibling and peer socialization).
In a related commentary on the intersubjective approach to 
the self that originated in object relations theory, Hollway (2006) 
highlights the dynamic dimension of the unconscious, noting,
At a time before the infant can experience any self 
boundaries, these are provided by the mother…[and]… 
Bion (1967) saw this in terms of the container (mother) 
and contained (infant). Projective identification for him 
is a form on unconscious communication which enables 
a receptive mother to experience the feelings of her baby, 
transform them by using her mind, and through her 
body and emotional state communicate these modified, 
hopefully detoxified, feelings back to the infant, who 
can feel them to be  bearable. The infant in this way 
borrows the mother’s mind, which only gradually 
becomes internalized to the point where it is the baby’s 
own resource. (p. 475).
Building on Klein’s ideas, Winnicott (1974) coined the well-
known phrase the “good-enough” mother, said to be  somebody 
who can “contain” both negative and positive identifications coming 
from the infant, transform and re-project such identifications, 
but which are now in modified from. The point worth emphasizing 
here is that such maternal or paternal projective identifications 
should be understood as part and parcel of ongoing unconscious 
relational dynamics. Hollway (2006) commenting on what relational 
or intersubjective psychoanalytic accounts have in common,
is the notion of a dynamic unconscious: “the way in 
which our mind transforms new relations into old ones 
(transference); others into parts of ourselves 
(introjection); and parts of ourselves into others 
(projection)” (Alford, 2002, p.  3), and it is this that 
distinguishes them from relational theories which revert 
to an idea of relationship between conscious, intentional 
bounded individuals. (p. 475).
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One of the first puzzling questions we  can ask is how the 
an extremely fragile ego constantly under threat of disintegration 
could introject and project in the first place, especially as these 
are said to be  psychic processes that require some degree of 
stability and boundedness. Essentially what seems to be involved 
in holding even the first elements of what might constitute a 
personality or ego together, is that this “keeping together” 
experience is “performed initially from outside.” Bick (1968) 
suggests that the baby has to struggle for the capacity to introject, 
and that this achievement of both infant and mother is related 
to embodiment, “The stage of primal splitting and idealization 
of self and object can now be  seen to rest on this earlier 
process of containment of self and object by their respective 
‘skins’” (Bick, 1968, p. 484). Embodiment presupposes containment 
and the establishment of boundaries, and it would seem that 
before the infant can do anything at all, it has to experience 
an object in such a way that it intuits the concept of a space 
that can hold things. In other words, interdependent with the 
experience of being fed, is the creation of an “inside,” and that,
(Bick)… showed the baby struggling for the capacity to 
introject and that this is a function of the skin, or rather 
a function of skin sensations which arouse fantasies of 
a containing object …(and)…the first introjection is the 
introjection of an object which provides a space into 
which objects can be introjected. Before projection can 
happen there has to be  an internal object capable of 
containing which can be projected into an object before 
that object can be  felt to contain a projection. 
(Hinshelwood, 1989, pp. 193–4).
It is in this way that the creation of a unified space comes 
about, where before there was none. Only with the existence 
of an internal psychologically enclosing space can the capacity 
to introject emerge. The first achievement is to win the concept 
of a space that holds things, “the infant in gaining the nipple 
in his mouth has an experience of acquiring such an object 
– an object that closes the hole (the mouth and other orifices) 
in the skin boundary. (Hinshelwood, 1989, p.  194).” This 
experience is fundamentally rooted in the somatic-affective 
domain. Whatever might constitute consciousness emerges from 
somatic, embodied, material-physical, tactile/affective experience 
– that is, a fundamentally social milieu.
Although the Kleinian account of psychic development starts 
from neurobiological assumptions regarding survival and 
existence (e.g., instincts) the boundaries between what constitutes 
the “external” and “internal” are initially very blurred. In other 
words, while it is assumed that at some basic level the infant 
orients to the fact that the breast-sustenance (part-object) is 
very much external, it is just as much a construction from 
within, or as Kristeva (2001) puts it:
(an) internal image, to the extent that the fragile ego, as 
it constructs and deconstructs the boundary between 
the inside and outside, is where this quasi-object (or this 
object-being-constituted) is formed. From the outset, 
then, the primal object of the paranoid-schizoid position 
emerges, in Klein’s view, if and only if it is an internal 
object constructed through a fantasy of omnipotence.
The initial experience for the infant became known as the 
paranoid-schizoid position, so called in that it amounts to the 
totality of the infant’s instinctual desires and unconscious 
phantasies – where the libidinally invested breast as the primary 
good object reflects the power of the life instinct. For the 
infant the experience of the immediate satiation of hunger/
distress is not something that is “happening-to-me” as a separate 
individual but rather a state of vacillating “omnipotence-to-pain/
annihilation” (thus the term “paranoid-shizoid” position)2. The 
metaphor of positions and movement between and within them 
should be  understood as a shifting affective-dynamic psychic 
vantage point. Gradually however, and realized in part through 
neurobiological maturation (around 3–6 months), the rudimentary 
and fragile elements/part-objects begin a gradual synthesis or 
coming together. There are both negative and positive aspects 
of this moving toward the rather sombrely termed “depressive 
position3”. The account here is that the infant begins to recognize 
that this gradually solidify “whole mother” is “understood to 
be  the sole site of both sustenance and privation, and while 
this is much closer to reality, it necessarily ushers in a sense 
of the painful imperfections and limitations of life.” (Likierman, 
2001, p.  101). A representative account is that:
The infant loses the precious sense that there exists, 
somewhere, an ideal object of unlimited pleasure and 
satisfaction. This triggers an experience of a “loss of the 
loved object.” The whole mother initially represents a 
despoiled perfection and provokes sorrow and indignant 
rage in turn. … It is this recognition that triggers the 
depressive position (Likierman, 2001, p. 101).
The depressive position, amongst other things, describes the 
initial recognition of awareness of separateness. In the paranoid-
schizoid position there is no such awareness. Before such inklings 
there is in effect, no infant, in other words, no subjectivity, 
no experience, no memory. However, there is a history that 
is marked on the body – it is just that there is no word-based 
history. This is what Winnicott (1974) meant when he  states 
there is no such thing as an infant initially, only the mother-
infant unit. The danger or challenge of becoming human is 
that of relating to people who ultimately you  have no control 
over (i.e., unlike in the paranoid-schizoid position with the 
phantasy of omnipotent control). Winnicott describes the infant 
as becoming capable of the capacity for “ruth” – the possibility 
of feeling concern for another person. This arises through the 
2 One might think of this is a place where all that is experienced is the illusion 
of complete control or the experience of pain (hungry – feeding happens; or 
hungry – pain/abandonment).
3 This movement from one position to another should not be seen as diachronic 
stage-like development. Instead, it is more akin to synchronic transformation, 
one where the initial experiences of the paranoid-schizoid position are overlaid 
with the depressive position, yet remain psychologically forever recoverable. 
The layering of positions is a more apt metaphor compared to the idea of a 
stage-like transition.
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gradual awareness that another person is a subject as well as 
an object. Gaining relatedness and a sense of subjectivity involves 
the giving up and loss of omnipotence and unity-of-twoness 
(i.e., there is no awareness of separateness in the mother-infant 
unit). The assumption is that at some level this is an affective/
emotional loss but nevertheless a necessary and required element 
of psychological development and growth. Hollway (2006) makes 
the point that Winnicott, and psychoanalysis more generally:
sees separation and the ability to differentiate between 
one’s own wishes and those emanating from outside as 
being crucial in the gradual achievement of self. Babies 
struggle to achieve unit status, and total independence 
is not the outcome of development. Winnicott (1968) 
understands children as proceeding from “absolute 
dependence, rapidly changing to relative dependence, 
and always travelling towards (but never reaching) 
independence” (p. 90). (Hollway, 2006, p. 476).
The gradual shifting away from the paranoid-schizoid position 
also engenders in the infant the desire to make reparation for 
the damage or destruction of the lost object (the phantasised 
internal object she used to have control over) who no longer 
exists. Hinshelwood (1989) comments that reparation, though 
it is concerned primarily with the state of the internal world 
and the good object (said to form the core of the personality) 
is usually expressed in action toward the mother. Kristeva 
(2001) makes the point that,
Klein’s depressive position offers yet another innovation, 
one that will eventually encourage creativity: the feeling 
of depression mobilizes the desire to make reparation to 
objects. The baby, by believing that he is responsible for 
the loss of his mother, also imagine that he can undo 
the nefarious effects of his aggression through her love 
and care for him. “The depressive conflict is a constant 
struggle between the infant’s destructiveness and his love 
and reparative impulses.” (Segal, 1990, p. 60). To deal 
with the depressive suffering that results from his feeling 
of having damaged the external and internal object, the 
baby tries to make reparation and restoration to the good 
object. His love only grows in the process. (p. 79)
The fact that the move into, or rather the overlaying over 
[the paranoid-schizoid position] of the depressive position, is 
interdependent with affective-semiotic-discursive dimensions of 
normativity underpins affective developmental psychoanalytic 
thought (Green, 1999). Keeping in mind that from the outset 
we  are dealing with a mother-child unit, the initial precursors 
to any process that leads to awareness involves something that 
you might call an affect-laden emotional mirroring that constitutes 
the interactive/participative expression of the mother-infant 
unit (i.e., we  need to remember, there are initially no separate 
entities). To paraphrase Winnicott’s description of the infant’s 
initial experience, “When I  look I  am  seen [by somebody else], 
so I exist; I  can now afford to look and see” (emphasis added). 
This apparently simplistic phrase requires some unraveling.
What is being suggested is that the baby sees herself and 
gradually attains some intuition of the “self ” through the 
reflection seen. Initially, what you  see (about your “self ”) is 
what the mother sees:
What does the baby see when he or she looks at the 
mother’s face? I am suggesting that, ordinarily, what the 
baby sees is himself or herself. In other words, the 
mother is looking at the baby and what she (the baby) 
looks like is related to what she (the mother) sees there. 
All this is too easily taken for granted.’ (Winnicott, 1971, 
p. 151 [Italics in the original]).
It is important to understand that what “she sees there”  – 
will be the mother’s own projections, wishes and desires regarding 
the “baby-entity.” Needless to say, these projections and desires 
are saturated, in fact interdependent with, the particular cultural 
discourses prevailing in any particular context (see Demuth 
et  al., 2012; for interesting examples of parental discursive 
difference across cultural contexts). And when the baby moves 
from existing (through being seen), and begins to “look and 
see,” what the infant sees (seeing with) is already colored by 
the desire or intentionality of the mother  - - the infants 
experience of the mother’s desire for it to exist [as an infant]; 
in other words, something akin to: “‘I want them to want me’ 
and that is the condition for my wanting them.” It is this 
complex interpenetration that forms the basis for the suggestion 
that the “inside” that is coming into being is already 
interdependently saturated with the “outside” (what is reflected 
back – through action, discourse, social semiosis of all forms).
In order to highlight the significance of action, transaction 
and affect in these mother–child dynamics Winnicott (1960) 
introduced the idea of a transitional space – which despite 
the everyday connotation that this amounts to something that 
exists between individuals, should be understood as both within-
and-without – as well as potentially present (internal) even 
when the young child is on their own. As an example of the 
affective dynamics of the transitional space, Winnicott (1974) 
for example, proposed that through the projection out of, and 
onto, the object the child produces the conditions which allow 
recognition of “feeling”(s) possible. Here, the use of the phrase 
“produces the conditions” is significant because it is not as if 
the child is first feeling bad and then simply “puts the badness” 
outside. Rather, it is the projection that amounts to a defense 
against the badness (the infant or young child represses the 
recognition of the “internal” badness’ – caused by hunger, 
aggressive impulse, constitutional characteristics or whatever  - 
by spontaneously producing the projection). And then, once 
projected outside, it can then (the badness) be  recognized as 
something “not very nice” but now, and very importantly no 
longer “inside,” but instead controllable and containable by 
being “in the other,” or “in the object.”
One can begin to see the significance of the idea of the 
transitional space for understanding affect, emotion, the 
identification of feeling(s) and how such experiences are related 
to the emergence of self-hood. In other words, in order to 
know that what is being experienced is “feeling” or affect never 
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mind identifying what that feeling is, this will involve object-
relations – interacting with others and objects within a transitional 
space. Such an approach to subjectivity is echoed in the work 
of Hollway (2006) who argues that we are psycho-social “because 
we are products of a unique life history of anxiety- and desire- 
provoking life events and the manner in which they have been 
transformed in internal reality…(and)…because unconscious 
defences are an intersubjective process.” (p.  466).
It was with reference to transitional dynamics that Winnicott 
(1974) suggested the mother should be  seen as the infant’s 
psychological matrix. In the beginning the mother provides 
the psychological or mental space within which the infant 
generates experience. Only gradually does the maternally provided 
psychological matrix begin to erode, and the infant tentatively 
initiates his/her own psychological matrix, one within which 
she/he develops the capacity to deal with separateness. What 
we  have then is this gradual transformation from “mother-as-
environment” toward “mother-as-object.” As the infant gradually 
attains individuation or awareness of “I-ness” she/he 
simultaneously begins to recognize the separateness of “infant-
mother,” i.e., infant as self/object, and mother as other/object. 
Psychoanalysts after Winnicott draw attention to that element 
of taking up (attaining) a place in the “depressive position” 
where the mother provides “presence but absence” i.e., 
paradoxically being physically present with the child yet 
psychologically absent and contrastively, being psychologically 
present with/to the child and yet physically absent. Ogden (1992) 
highlights the ambiguous nature of this process, commenting,
This paradox can be understood in the following way: 
the mother is absent as object, but is there as the 
unnoticed, but present containing space in which the 
child is playing. The mother must not make her presence 
as object too important, for this would lead to child to 
become addicted to her as omnipotent object. The 
development of the capacity to be alone is a process in 
which the mother’s role as invisible co-author of 
potential space is taken over by (what is becoming) the 
child. In this sense, the healthy individual, when alone, 
is always in the presence of the self-generated 
environmental mother. (p. 182) [emphasis added]
The proposal that the “internal,” private experiential domain 
is in effect initially interpenetrated with the experiences of 
another (the mother) necessitates accommodating a somewhat 
paradoxical way of thinking – certainly one at odds with ideas 
on the construction of the self in cognitive-developmental 
psychology (e.g., Harter, 1999; Pfeifer and Peake, 2012). The 
suggestion that the formulating elements of a sense of self are 
in effect co-authored, with the infant initially possessing no 
recognition of what is going on, points to a certain ambiguity 
regarding symbolization and the social-semiotic basis of self-
ness. In a way this could be  understood as the sense of self 
forever containing the “shadow of the other” (mother) in 
addition to the observation that entering or taking up a self-
position in discourse and language presupposes the appropriation 
of the available discourses in context.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Part of the impetus for this review topic is the concern with 
examining the interdependence between psychological 
phenomena and the discursive and embodied practices of social 
interaction. Earlier the suggestion was made that part of the 
reason why CA has particular difficulties with addressing the 
relationship between affect and action, is the avoidance or 
elision of discussion regarding any construct or concept that 
presupposes an interiority of mental states, internal psychic 
life or inaccessible affective state. Such a view is certainly 
defensible given the suspicion over the excessive formalism of 
contemporary cognitive science allayed with debatable ascriptions 
regarding the causal dynamics of the cognition-emotion-behavior 
link (Coulter, 1999). It is also defensible given the participant-
oriented empirical criteria of CA and the associated skepticism 
regarding over-interpretation. But at the same time, there may 
be  a sense in which CA, in avoiding theoretical dialogue with 
psychoanalytic thought is missing an opportunity to examine 
implicit presuppositional assumptions that may lie behind 
adopting agnostic positions. In other words, the manner in 
which elision take place seems to result in there nevertheless 
remaining (if “neutral”) an implicit model of the infant/child 
mind, e.g., a resource identifying pattern detecting entity 
(Wootton, 1997; Lerner et  al., 2011). The participant-oriented 
evidential requirements of CA may engender a reticence to 
consider what alternative, if somewhat marginalized perspectives 
such as object-relations theory and psycho-social approaches 
might have to offer. The proposal is that CA may find in 
psychoanalytic thinking a fruitful framework for understanding 
the interdependence between affect and action.
A number of possible directions for an empirically grounded 
CA theory of personhood/subjectivity could emerge from studies 
that for example, examine in detail the earliest moments of 
parent-infant engagement, documenting and explicating the 
multi-modal dimensions of participation, action, and affect. 
Mondada (2019) in a recent commentary on expanding multi-
modal analysis in CA, makes that point that participants engage 
with their bodies not only to communicate with each other, 
but also in sensing the world – arguing that multisensorial 
practices are intersubjectively organized. Infant-focused CA 
studies of the earliest sensorial experiences following birth might 
help highlight how the status of “subjectivity” or personhood 
comes about in the first instance. Furthermore, examining these 
earliest moments longitudinally would help identify the 
circumstances within which the presuppositional grounding of 
the “infant-as-subject” begins to emerge. One could also begin 
to examine, given Winnicott’s (1968) argument, whether in 
the talk and discourse that mothers and fathers first direct 
toward infants, we  find evidence of culturally specific 
representations of idealized infancy (e.g., along lines similar 
to Demuth et  al., 2012). Finally, we  might conjecture that if 
whatever we  understand as unconscious defenses are in fact 
intersubjectively constituted, then by examining early parent–
child interaction at a sufficiently level of granularity, we  should 
be  able to highlight those circumstances whereby the infant/
young child learns what not to say – learning that there is 
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much beyond language that needs to be  kept under control 
(inappropriate actions, non-verbal misdeeds and associated 
behaviors that might contravene the “doing being ordinary” 
of everyday members’ methods).
By way of a concluding comment one can say that in the 
work of psychoanalysts such as Klein and Winnicott we  are 
presented with a thoroughly relational conception of human 
nature. Phenomenologically, psychic life is already socially (and 
discursively) saturated. From this perspective it would seem 
that some form of affective-normativity suffuses the earliest 
experiences of the infant’s life, given that from the outset 
identificatory phenomena (introjection and projection) are not 
only part and parcel of embodiment, but are also conveyed, 
recognized and produced within and through the prevailing 
discourses, which constitute social action. However, this is not 
to presuppose the methodological shadow of a discursive or 
CA “master-discourse.” Hollway (2011) adopting a psycho-social 
perspective and commenting on the growing need to go beyond 
the “empty” subject of discourse analysis, argues that inner 
psychic processes are not “purely psychological,” if that means 
sealed off from the external world, and that the boundaries 
between the inner and outer are porous, neither autonomous 
or static, and that psychoanalytic theory,
specifies the way processes like splitting and identification 
act on social and cultural material (through meaning 
making and the expression of agency in practices). It 
does provide accounts of “how internal mental contents 
might be transformed” (citing Wetherell, 2003, p. 115; 
Hollway, 2011, p. 11).
Essentially, the proposal developed above highlights the 
tantalizing possibility that all “psychic” or psychological life 
(whatever we  understand that to be) is somehow inherently 
social or infused with a socially shared normativity. We  are 
of course still left with the challenge of how the affect-laden 
socially normativity that may underpin embodied parent-infant 
practices seen at the beginnings of life, finds expression – 
particularly given the suggestion that the essence of affect is 
“its capacity to seep into other domains and inhabit them” 
(Green, 1999, p. 285). Contemporary research in child-focused 
CA appears to be explicating how such seepage finds expression.
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